How to play fair in international environmental agreements? - Bridging psychological and economic methods

Cornelia Ohl and Heidi Ittner

No 22/2005, UFZ Discussion Papers from Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS)

Abstract: Global public good provision (e.g. environmental quality) confronts us with problems demanding both national and international co-operation. However among sovereign nations reaching agreement on mutual public good provision is difficult. Slowing down global warming is just one example. Due to the diffusion of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere it is attractive for each individual state that other countries commit themselves to climate protection, whereas one's own state using the free-rider-strategy benefits from the protective measures of the others without making any costly national contribution. On the other hand such a strategic behaviour clashes with moral values, especially concerning motives of justice within society. Should free-riding be preferred from the strategic point of view or rather, out of consideration to justice, national commitments to contribute to climate protection? Therefore, an analysis of how appraisals of justice and strategic considerations interact is a challenge to international (environmental) policy. Taking a game-theoretic point of view, we analyse three psychological-empirical conceptions of justice: need, equality and equity, and point out how these principles are able to determine the type of game nations are expected to play.

Date: 2005
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/45261/1/505415186.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ufzdps:222005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UFZ Discussion Papers from Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().