Tax consultants' incentives: A game-theoretic investigation into the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity

Markus Grottke and Johannes Lorenz

No B-30-17, Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe from University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: We propose a game-theoretic investigation to capture the interplay between the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity. Our purpose is to provide answers to two research questions: Which aspects of the strategic interaction between the players induce tax consultants to provide inaccurate consulting services? How can we change the incentive structure in order to improve tax consulting quality? We find that tax consultants can be best motivated to work accurately by exogenously increasing the probability of tax underpayment and by ensuring that the tax authority corrects both tax underpayment and tax overpayment.

Keywords: tax consultant; tax law; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 K34 M48 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:upadbr:b3017

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