Contracts induced by means of bribery: Should they be void or valid?

Mathias Nell

No V-53-07, Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe from University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It is argued that other instruments are more suitable for preventing corruption.

Keywords: Bribery; Contracts; Corruption; Due Diligence; Enforcement; Impugnment; Liability; Leniency; Nullity; Private Law Validity; Voidability; Voluntary Disclosure (Program) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G38 K12 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v5307

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