Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle

Kai Konrad, Changxia Ke and Florian Morath

VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members fight against each other about the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former brothers in arms fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Further, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share equally and peacefully.

JEL-codes: D70 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle (2013)
Working Paper: Brothers in arms - An experiment on the alliance puzzle (2013)
Working Paper: Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle (2011)
Working Paper: Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle (2010)
Working Paper: Brothers in arms: An experiment on the alliance puzzle (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62038

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