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Partial Public Ownership and Managerial Incentives

Dragan Jovanovic

VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. A novelty of the paper is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We find that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all firms are partially owned by the government. When partially public firms compete with private firms, the effects on managerial incentives crucially depend on the degree of competitive pressure. Thereby, PPO induces either partially public firms or their private competitors to offer stronger managerial incentives. This result is essentially confirmed even if the government's primary concern is consumer protection rather than social welfare.

JEL-codes: D82 H32 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62039

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