Hidden Costs of Control in Social Groups
Simon Wiederhold () and
VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
This paper investigates the role of social identity in reactions to control. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups. Our laboratory experiment shows that, in contrast to no-group agents, agents in social groups (i) perform better; (ii) expect less control; (iii) do not reciprocate when facing less control than expected; (iv) decrease their performance substantially when actual control exceeds their expectation. Hidden costs of control thus appear to be more substantial in social groups.
JEL-codes: C92 D03 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:65407
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