"Making it count": Evidence from a Field Experiment on Assessment Rules, Study Incentives and Student Performance
Melanie Luehrmann,
Arnaud Chevalier and
Peter Dolton
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Melanie Lührmann
VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Abstract:
This paper examines field experiment in which we encourage the use of computer-based tests (quizzes) through a set of non-financial incentives and test their effect on effort and performance of students. Our identification strategy exploits cross-cohort experimental variation in assessment rules and within course variation in incentives to determine their impact on the performance in exams. We find these incentives to result in an increase in grades of 2.4 marks or about 4%. The performance effects are concentrated in the lower quartile of the grade distribution and can be attributed to increase quiz participation. Our results suggest that use of computerised assessment methods is not only a relatively low cost method of fostering continuous learning but also an effective tool in increasing student effort and performance.
JEL-codes: A23 D20 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79795
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