Natural-resource rents and internal conflicts - Can decentralization lift the curse?

Gunther Markwardt, Mohammad Reza Farzanegan () and Christian Lessmann

VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We study how natural-resource rents a ffect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural-resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive e ffect of the natural-resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data covering the period 1984{2004 from more than 90 countries, we find evidence that natural-resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is signi cantly mitigated by decentralization.

JEL-codes: H77 P28 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse? (2018)
Working Paper: Natural-Resource Rents and Internal Conflicts - Can Decentralization Lift the Curse? (2013)
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