EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Company Law and Firm Entry

Susanne Prantl and Ulrike Böhme

Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: In this paper, we study the impact of the entry costs imposed by the German Limited Liability Company Law on firm entry. The law implies an expensive and complex incorporation process. As entrepreneurs choose between legal forms when entering the market, either a legal form with limited liability or without it, we suggest an empirical approach for identifying entry cost effects that takes this decision into account by exploiting the natural experiment in entry regulation following from German reunification. The empirical findings show, in particular, that entry costs based on the German Limited Liability Company Law cause an increase in entry size for limited liability firms. In addition, we report that the entry rate for limited liability firms, as well as the sustained entry rate, is lowered.

JEL-codes: K22 L25 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-sbm
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80486

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2018-11-24
Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80486