Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Florian Morath, Luisa Herbst and Kai Konrad

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.

JEL-codes: C78 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Related works:
Journal Article: Balance of power and the propensity of conflict (2017)
Working Paper: Balance of power and the propensity of conflict (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112837

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