Collusive effects of a monopolist's use of an intermediary to deliver to retailers

Isabel Teichmann and Vanessa von Schlippenbach

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further if the upstream firm chooses a mixed distribution system in which it makes use of an intermediary to distribute the good to a subset of the retailers and delivers directly only to the remaining downstream firms.

JEL-codes: L12 L14 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Related works:
Working Paper: Collusive Effects of a Monopolist's Use of an Intermediary to Deliver to Retailers (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112948

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