Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?

Marcel Thum and Kai Konrad

VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information about each other's preferences about reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of the clean development mechanism (CDM) for the likelihood of such failure. The CDM has been introduced in the context of the Kyoto Protocol to allow countries to make efficiency enhancing use of cross-country low- cost mitigation opportunities. We use a simple bargaining framework to uncover why this mechanism may reduce the likelihood for reaching an efficient cooperative climate agreemen

JEL-codes: H41 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Related works:
Journal Article: Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements? (2018)
Working Paper: Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113174

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