Pooling hawks and doves: Interim-efficient labor contracts for other-regarding agents

Thomas Daske ()

VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Behavioral contract theory typically argues that agents who differ in their intrinsic motivations to collaborate or to compete would be screened by principals or self-sort in labor market equilibrium. This view contrasts with the empirical observation that workers' perceived support from coworkers is a key factor for labor turnover. The present study considers a principal-multiple agents model with independent efforts. Agents are privately informed about their more or less pronounced altruistic (spiteful) preferences. It is shown that the interim-efficient labor contract is a pooling contract that ex interim Pareto-dominates any allocation that could be achieved under complete information. Hence, all parties prefer the composition of social types to be random. The distributive effects of interim-efficient contracting are closely related to the hawk-dove game, with workers suffering from less altruistic coworkers. The results indicate that corporate culture has a random component associated with workers' intrinsic motivations to collaborate or to compete.

JEL-codes: D82 D86 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145951

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