The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks

Lydia Mechtenberg and Berno Büchel

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show that communication can undermine effciency of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. We test the model in a lab experiment and find strong support for the predicted effects.

JEL-codes: C91 D72 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mic, nep-net, nep-pay, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The swing voter's curse in social networks (2019)
Working Paper: The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks (2017)
Working Paper: The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks (2017)
Working Paper: The swing voter's curse in social networks (2017)
Working Paper: The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168094

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