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Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?

Marco Sahm

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players which are matched once with each other. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament is almost fair (highly discriminatory): Subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players’ ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs are small (large). Discrepancy results from a higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-spo
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