High Cost Pool in a Health Status Based Risk Adjustment System – Some Conceptional and Empirical Considerations

Juergen Wasem, Florian Buchner, Gerald Lux and Sonja Schillo

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Competitive social health insurance systems (at least) in Western Europe have implemented systems of morbidity based risk adjustment to set a level playing field for insurers. However, many high cost insured still are heavily underfunded despite risk adjustment, leaving incentives for risk selection. In most of these health care systems, there is an ongoing debate about how to deal with such underpaid high cost cases. This study develops four distinct concepts by adding variables to risk adjustment or by setting up a high cost pool for underpaid insured besides the risk adjustment system. Their features, incentives and distributional effects are discussed. With a data set of 6 million insured, performance is demonstrated for Germany. All models achieve a substantial improvement in model fit, measured in terms of R2 as well as CPM. As the results of the various models are different in different dimensions, the trade-offs that have to be dealt with and should be addressed, when implementing a model to reduce underfunding of high cost cases.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea and nep-ias
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168122

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