Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology
Wolfgang Buchholz () and
Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology.
JEL-codes: C72 H41 O31 Q54 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology (2019)
Working Paper: Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168153
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