Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis

Nicola Maaser, Stefan Traub and Fabian Paetzel

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: In real world bargaining the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect real power. Game-theory predictions are insensitive to nominal differences. We refer to the converse idea that nominal differences matter as power illusion. We experimentally study the Baron-Ferejohn model with variation in nominal power. We find strong evidence for the existence of power illusion. Thus, attention needs to be paid to nominal power in the design of weighted voting systems.

JEL-codes: C7 C92 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168155

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