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International Tax Evasion, State Purchases of Confidential Bank Data and Voluntary Disclosures

Dirk Bethmann and Michael Kvasnicka

Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: State purchases of bank data on suspected tax evaders from international tax havens constitute a potential tool to combat international tax evasion. Using self-compiled data for North-Rhine Westphalia on the timing and content of such data acquisitions from whistleblowers and on monthly voluntary disclosures of international tax evasion involving Swiss banks, we show that purchases of data by tax authorities on potential tax evaders have a positive and sizeable effect on voluntary disclosures.

JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-iue and nep-pbe
Date: 2017
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168175/1/VfS-2017-pid-2963.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: International Tax Evasion, State Purchases of Confidential Bank Data and Voluntary Disclosures (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: International Tax Evasion, State Purchases of Confidential Bank Data and Voluntary Disclosures (2016) Downloads
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