Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement

Helene Mass, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2016) show that such regulation poses virtually no restriction on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule – imitation perfection – that restricts discrimination significantly. With homogeneous bidders, imitation perfection implies that all bidders earn the same surplus in every equilibrium conditional on their valuation.

Date: 2017
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168217/1/VfS-2017-pid-3242.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement (2020)
Working Paper: Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168217

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