Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement
Vitali Gretschko and
Achim Wambach ()
Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2016) show that such regulation poses virtually no restriction on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule – imitation perfection – that restricts discrimination significantly. With homogeneous bidders, imitation perfection implies that all bidders earn the same surplus in every equilibrium conditional on their valuation.
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Working Paper: Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168217
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