Entitlements and Loyalty in Groups: An Experimental Study

Fabian Paetzel and Rupert Sausgruber

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We study loyalty in groups that are exogenously assigned based on members' performances in a task. We observe that in-group bias is strong and significant among subjects who score high in performance, and that it is weak and insignificant among those who score low. This asymmetric pattern is mirrored in the punishment of disloyal subjects within groups. The results are consistent with an explanation according to which fairness judgments depend on entitlement considerations and provide a new perspective on theory and empirical research that argues that group identity increases with the status of the group.

Keywords: entitlements; fairness; group loyalty; status; punishment; social norms; minimal groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D31 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168224

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