Free Trade Agreements, Customs Unions In Disguise?

Feodora Teti, Gabriel Felbermayr and Erdal Yalcin

VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We document a hitherto overlooked stylized fact: countries’ external tariff schedules are surprisingly similar. The correlation is particularly striking for countries belonging to the same deep preferential trade agreement (PTA). We show that most of this is due to selection effects rather than to ex post convergence. This has an important implication: In most PTAs, for a vast majority of products, trade deflection is not profitable even in the absence of costly rules of origin.

JEL-codes: F10 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168243

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