Regulatory Chill and the Effect of Investor State Dispute Settlements
Eckhard Janeba ()
Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
Legal conflicts between multinational firms and host governments are often decided by international arbitration panels known as Investor State Dispute Settlements (ISDS). Critics fear that ISDS favors multinational firms, and make s governments reluctant to adopt appropriate policies (regulatory chill). I develop an economic model to analyze regulatory chill and show under which conditions a move to ISDS is beneficial.
JEL-codes: F23 F53 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Regulatory chill and the effect of investor state dispute settlements (2019)
Working Paper: Regulatory Chill and the Effect of Investor State Dispute Settlements (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168255
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