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Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems

Simon Reif (), Sebastian Wichert and Amelie Wuppermann

Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: Birth weight manipulation is common in DRG systems. Hospitals receive more money for cases with weight below certain thresholds, which could benefit newborns. Also, some reimbursement thresholds overlap with diagnostic thresholds that have been shown to affect medical care. Based on all hospital births in Germany from 2005-2011, we investigate whether this triggers different care. We find that this is not the case, suggesting that financial incentives do not directly impact care for newborns.

JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-hea
Date: 2017
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168258/1/VfS-2017-pid-3466.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Is it good to be too light? Birth weight thresholds in hospital reimbursement systems (2017) Downloads
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