Simple Bayesian and Ex-Post Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions

Marion Ott

VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: This paper derives Bayesian equilibria under general conditions for a broad family of sealed-bid combinatorial auction formats under incomplete information. Equilibria are constructed by linking an equilibrium of the combinatorial auction format to an equilibrium of its single-unit version, thereby providing a closed-form expression if the single-unit version has one. Auction formats that share the same single-unit version, like the Vickrey auction and all bidder-optimal core-selecting auctions, have common equilibria for any number of items and bidders. Furthermore, if an ex-post equilibrium exists in the single-unit version of an auction then the auction format has an ex-post equilibrium in the combinatorial auction. We characterize the ex-post equilibria for a subfamily of auctions.

Keywords: Combinatorial auction; Bayesian equilibrium; equilibrium existence; ex-post equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203616

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