Subsidizing Quantity Donations: Matches, Rebates, and Discounts Compared

Johannes Diederich, Catherine Eckel, Raphael Epperson, Timo Goeschl and Philip Grossman

VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We present online-experimental evidence that challenges the generalizability of established results on subsidizing giving by considering a "quantity donation" scheme. We define this scheme as one in which donors choose how many units of a charitable good to fund, rather than the amount of money to give. We find that different subsidy types are equally effective in raising funds. This contrasts with the common result of matches being superior to rebates. The finding masks a higher likelihood of giving under rebates and larger donations under matches and discounts. Our results emphasize the role of small changes in the donation environment.

Keywords: Charitable giving; subsidies; online field experiment; framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D12 D64 H24 H41 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/203650/1/VfS-2019-pid-28244.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203650

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().