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Price discovery and gains from trade in asset markets with insider trading

Tobias Brünner and René Levínský ()

VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of reduced gains from trade. The model further implies that in the presence of insider information the call auction performs worse than continuous double auction. Testing these hypotheses in the lab we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the realized gains from trade. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, the call auction does not perform worse than the continuous double auction. In fact, when the probability of insider information is high, the call auction has the most informative prices and highest realized gains from trade. Our experiment provides new evidence, from markets with very asymmetrically dispersed information, that lends support to the decision by many stock exchanges to use call auctions when information asymmetries are severe and the need for accurate prices is large, e.g., at the open or close of the trading day.

Keywords: call market; call auction; double auction; asymmetric information; experiment; informational efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D82 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-fmk, nep-mst and nep-ore
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