Regulatory autonomy and multilateral disciplines: The dilemma and a possible resolution

Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian

No TISD-98-02, WTO Staff Working Papers from World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division

Abstract: A major challenge for the multilateral trading system is to secure the benefits of trade liberalization without infringing on the freedom of governments to pursue legitimate domestic objectives. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between two types of situations. In one, a non-protectionist government cannot prevent certain domestic policies from incidentally discriminating against foreign competitors. In the other, a protectionist government uses a legitimate objective as an excuse to design domestic policies which inhibit foreign competition. The challenge is to devise rules which are sensitive to the difference between these two situations, exonerating the former while preventing the latter. The approach suggested in this paper is to create a presumption in favour of the economically efficient policy measure, with departures inviting justification.

Keywords: international trade; regulation; national treatment; protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K20 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wtowps:tisd9802

DOI: 10.30875/58942cae-en

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