Fragmentation in property: Towards a general model

Norbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi and Ben Depoorter

No 32, W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers from University of Würzburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. To this end, we differentiate between different forms of property fragmentation. With the use of several functionally related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized as building blocks for the development of a general model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Specifically, our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increase monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we explore some of the important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.

JEL-codes: D62 D70 K10 K11 K19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wuewep:32

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