The Treuhandanstalt, privatization and the role of the courts

Mark K. Cassell

No FS I 96-316, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: The paper considers how the Treuhandanstalt's legal identity as both a publicand private entity helps to explain the process of privatization or creation of property by the state after 1989. I argue the agency did not easily fit within the rigid categories of the German legal system. Moreover, its hybrid status limitedthe degree to which individuals or groups could make use of the courts to holdthe agency accountable. As neither a fully public nor fully private entity, the agency's status successfully circumvented a number of traditional forms ofcontrol that exist in both public and private agencies in Germany. As a result, privatization was defined in a very narrow neo-liberal sense despite what one would predict from the standard accounts of the German Model.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbece:fsi96316

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