Regulatory reform and market opening in Japan

Mark Tilton

No FS I 97-305, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: This paper examines the nature of Japanese regulation, its effect on international trade, and the reasons for the slow progress of deregulation. It argues that theinformal and discretionary power of the Japanese bureaucracy, combined with acontinued protectionist, pro-producer, and pro-insider bias to the manipulation of the regulatory system, continues to maintain high prices and discourage imports into Japanese markets. The paper also argues that Japan's weak anti-trust enforcementallows cartels to play an important role in regulating Japanese markets, particularly inindustries such as steel and chemicals. While liberal initiatives have introduced some important regulatory reforms, they have not fundamentally transformed the Japanese regulatory system because neither business nor the bureaucracy genuinely wantdrastic reform or free-wheeling markets. Liberal reformist measures in Japan are animportant corrective and supplement to mercantilist policy, but are not likely tofundamentally transform Japan's political-economic system

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbece:fsi97305

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