Pensions with early retirement and without commitment
Michael Neugart
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment from WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Abstract:
In this paper it is shown that more generous early retirement provisions as well as lower employment lead to lower steady state pension rates if governments weigh the welfare of the older persons relatively strongly. A relatively stronger weight on the welfare of the young reverses the results. The driving forces behind those findings are governments that cannot commit to pension policies and consequently take into account future governments' policies when maximizing electoral support from the currently young and old constituencies.
Date: 2006
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Journal Article: Pensions with early retirement and without commitment (2009)
Working Paper: Pensions with early retirement and without commitment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzblpe:spi2006120
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