Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects

Hidekazu Anno and Morimitsu Kurino

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; second-best incentive compatibility; top trading cycles rules; deferred acceptance rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2014201

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