Selfless ignorance: Too good to be true
No SP II 2018-208, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center
We use a range of dictator game experiments to investigate whether people avoid information altruistically. After learning about a product with positive externalities, a consumer may avoid learning the cost of the product so that she does not hesitate to act altruistically. We find that although a few altruistic people avoid information about their own costs, this does not change the overall rate of altruistic behavior. The result suggests that although concealing costs upfront might make a few people let go of learning them, it does not increase the rate of altruistic behavior.
Keywords: Pro-social behavior; Self-Image; Information Avoidance; Moral Wiggle Room (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 D83 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2018208
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