Investment in the absence of property rights: the role of incumbency advantages
Investitionsanreize bei unvollständigen Eigentumsrechten: die Rolle von Asymmetrien in Aneignungskonflikten
Kai Konrad
No FS IV 01-18, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Abstract:
In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.
Keywords: Investment; endogenous property rights; contests; incumbency advantage; proprietary states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D72 D74 H54 O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51142/1/337572283.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages (2002) 
Working Paper: Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages (2002) 
Working Paper: Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages (2001) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0118
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