Fiscal federalism and risk sharing in Germany: the role of size differences

Risikokonsolidierung im Rahmen des deutschen Länderfinanzausgleichs: die Rolle von Größenunterschieden

Kai Konrad and Helmut Seitz

No FS IV 01-20, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We study the effect of size differences for an optimal risk sharing system of intergovernmental transfers in Germany. The German fiscal transfer system should account for the fact that an optimal insurance mechanism has the property that smaller states contribute a smaller share of their tax revenue to the redistribution mechanism.

Keywords: Fiscal federalism; risk sharing; size asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H41 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0120

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