Physician reimbursement, time-consistency and the quality of care

Ärztevergütung, Zeitkonsistenz und die Qualität medizinischer Leistungen

Robert Nuscheler

No FS IV 02-16, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians’ incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best policy. Moreover, the second-best policy is time inconsistent. Excess entry and firstbest efficient total quality provision is observed in the game without commitment. Allowing physicians to compete in prices does not solve the commitment problem since the competitive solution coincides with the time consistent outcome. In the median voter equilibrium the time consistency problem is more severe.

Keywords: Economics of health care markets; time consistency; price regulation; quality competition; spatial competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 L51 R10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and the Quality of Care (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0216

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