Employment protection and product market competition

Kündigungsschutz und der Wettbewerb auf Produktmärkten

Sebastian Kessing

No FS IV 02-31, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.

Keywords: Employment protection; contests; all-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Employment Protection and Product Market Competition (2006)
Working Paper: Employment Protection And Product Market Competition (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0231

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