The breakdown of authority

Das Versagen der Autorität

Lars Frisell

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking, i.e., where superiors make the decisions and subordinates either defy or submit to the authority. Superiors differ in the degree to which they fear defiance. The superiors who need obedience most face a fundamental credibility problem, which, in fact, makes them the least likely to be obeyed. The subordinate’s competence has conflicting effects on the superior’s welfare: competent subordinates comprise better sources of information but also harsher yardsticks. The result is that superiors prefer subordinates of medium competence.

Keywords: Authority; organization theory; autocratic decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200307

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