Union strategy and optimal income taxation

Gewerkschaftsstrategie und optimale Einkommensteuer

Sebastian Kessing and Kai Konrad

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to nonwelfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.

Keywords: Optimal income taxation; labor unions; work hours (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation (2005)
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