Disentangling the effects of political fragmentation on voter turnout: the Flemish municipal elections

Auswirkungen politischer Zersplitterung auf die Wahlbeteiligung: die flämischen Kommunalwahlen

Benny Geys and Bruno Heyndels

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Political fragmentation has been shown to be an important determinant of electoral turnout. We introduce an empirical approach that allows disentangling the impact of two dimensions of such fragmentation: the number of parties and the size inequalities between those parties. This is important as it allows us to assess the size, significance and direction of the individual effects of each element – an aspect disregarded in previous research. Our empirical analysis of the 2000 Flemish municipal elections shows that a higher number of parties competing in the election lowers turnout. The size-inequalities between the parties exert a positive – though insignificant – influence on voter participation.

Keywords: Voter turnout; political fragmentation; local elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: DISENTANGLING THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION ON VOTER TURNOUT: THE FLEMISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200607

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