The Impact of Government Subsidies in Professional Team Sports Leagues

Helmut Dietl, Markus Lang and Cornel Nesseler ()

No 366, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Abstract: This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club rofits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.

Keywords: Subsidy; team sports; competitive balance; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zrh:wpaper:366

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