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The Effect of Inspector Absence on Referee Behavior: Evidence from Amateur Soccer

Andrin Hediger, Pascal Flurin Meier () and Egon Franck ()
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Pascal Flurin Meier: Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich
Egon Franck: Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich

No 404, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Abstract: Periodic inspections play a crucial role in maintaining regulatory compliance, yet the need for constant inspection to maintain effective compliance remains a topic of discussion. We exploit a quasi-experimental setting that allows for a clean identification of changes in behavior even in the inspector’s absence: the inspector absence effect (IAE). Using data from amateur soccer, our findings show that amateur referees impose significantly fewer disciplinary sanctions when they are not inspected, which suggests that the awareness of being monitored influences their enforcement of the rules. The effect varies by career stage: aspiring referees reduce disciplinary sanctions in the inspector’s absence, whereas peak-career referees may become somewhat stricter. Furthermore, unannounced inspections influence behavior, albeit with a less pronounced IAE. These results provide causal empirical evidence that periodic inspections significantly impact decision-making. Our study emphasizes the importance of inspection design that influences agent behavior and ensures consistent rule enforcement.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; Rule enforcement; Inspector; Referee; Soccer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D91 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2025-06
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