On the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of non-linear utilities

Alexey Kushnir () and Shuo Liu

No 212, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.

Keywords: Bayesian implementation; dominant strategy implementation; mechanism design; non-linear utilities; single-crossing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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