Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

Antonio Miralles and Marek Pycia

No 385, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.

Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium; pseudomarkets; market design; revelation principle; welfare theorems; equilibrium existence; discrete markets; complementarities; constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources (2021)
Working Paper: Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:385

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