On market prices in double auctions

Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski and Marek Pycia

No 404, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We address some open issues regarding the characterization of double auctions. Our model is a two-sided commodity market with either finitely or infinitely many traders. We first unify existing formulations for both finite and infinite markets and generalize the characterization of market clearing in the presence of ties. Second, we define a mechanism that achieves market clearing in any, finite or infinite, market instance and show that it coincides with the k-double auction by Rustichini et al. (1994) in the former case. In particular, it clarifies the consequences of ties in submissions and makes common regularity assumptions obsolete. Finally, we show that the resulting generalized mechanism implements Walrasian competitive equilibrium.

Keywords: Double auction; Walrasian equilibrium; finite and infinite markets; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:404

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