On asymmetric equilibria in rent-seeking contests with strictly increasing returns

Christian Ewerhart

No 477, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper revisits the n-player rent-seeking contest with homogeneous valuations and increasing returns. Our main result says that, for any m ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, there are threshold values 1

Keywords: Rent-seeking contests; increasing returns; asymmetric equilibria; monotone comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:477

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