Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy

Bruno Frey, Marcel Kucher and Alois Stutzer

No 25, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct democracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second part, we demonstrate that reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights. This is not only the case because people value political outcomes higher but they derive utility from the political process itself.

Keywords: Direct Democracy; Power; Compensating Wage Differentials; Satisfaction with Life; Process Utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H73 I31 J32 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Working Paper: Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy (1999)
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