Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Dirk Engelmann and Urs Fischbacher

No 132, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

Keywords: indirect reciprocity; experimental economics; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D64 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (86)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game (2009)
Working Paper: Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game (2008)
Working Paper: Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:132

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