Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?

Matthias Benz and Bruno Frey

No 166, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learn from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behavior of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. Proposals in four specific areas are discussed: manager compensation, the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of the corporation.

Keywords: Corporate governance; public governance; agency theory; intrinsic motivation; democracy; public administration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 H1 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cfn and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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